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Introduction 
The importance of using formal methods in developing critical safety systems is now widely 
recognised [1, 2]. One of the well-known formal methods that supported with some tools is the 
B-method [3, 4, and 5]. B-method can support the whole life-cycle of software development. It 
has been applied to many research case studies and it has also been used in various industrial, 
critical applications like railway system, healthcare and etc. with high level of safety concern [6, 
7]. 
Some effort has already been taking place in applying B-Method for system-level modelling 
[8] and there are varieties of suggested amendments in original B-Method available to make it 
more suitable for modelling of distributed and event-based systems [9, 10]. 
In this case study, we considering an event-based, system-level, modelling and refinement of 
a “Distributed Monitoring and Control System” for vehicle entering and leaving a controlled area 
using B. The system consists of different subsystems like the safety barriers and the remote-
control. The main property of the undertaken system is the asynchronous nature of the 
communication between subsystems which is susceptible to delay, loss and error. This property 
can cause data to become inconsistent. 
As usual we start with an informal presentation of the system followed by a very high-level 
formal specification of user requirements in single machine. By introducing stepwise 
refinements of preliminary formal specification we have tried to show how a single machine can 
be refined to a set of concrete machines that precisely define the operations of a whole 
distributed system.    
 
Informal presentation of the Monitoring and Control System 
The main idea is to elaborate a distributed monitoring and security control system, which will 
be able to monitor and control the access of certain authorised vehicles to some hazardous areas 
according to a predefined security policy. The system consist of two main physical parts, remote-
control and safety barriers. These two parts communicate with each other through external 
communication link. The barriers can control access to two different areas, which are called 
Controlled and Protected Areas.  A simple illustration of such areas is provided in fig (1). The 
Controlled Area surrounds the Protected Area. According to a predefined policy only during 
some special intervals of times a vehicle can enter the Controlled Area. In addition only 
authorised vehicle can enter the protected area based on the current security policy. The policy 
for accessing Controlled and Protected Area can be updated by an on-site official using the 
Remote-Control and the updated information will be send to related barriers. 
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Access to areas will be controlled by safety barriers which are able to communicate with the 
Remote-Control unit. It is clear that communication links are bidirectional and both parts are 
able of sending and receiving information. The communication link between barrier components 
and remote-control unit are at risk of delay, loss and error that must be taken in to account during 
system design. Implementing the security policy using special security tags on authorised 
vehicles has been considered. A set of valid tags can be introduced in the system and the remote-
control is able to update the system with a new tag. Every tag is associated with particular access 
policy and this policy can be changed according to an update from the remote-control. 
The remote-control can monitor the status of any barrier unit, change the status of controlled-
area from blocked to unblocked or vice versa, update the set of valid tags, update the set of 
authorised vehicles, update the access policy associated with every valid tag and communicate to 
barriers unit with information related to above actions. The remote-control also can override the 
security policy in emergency cases to allow the system for entrance of an unauthorised vehicle to 
protected area.  
 The Barriers of protected-area can detect the presence of a vehicle, detect whether it contain 
a security tag and distinguish between different types of tag. Access is granted only to a single 
vehicle with an appropriate tag. Otherwise access is denied. A barrier can be opened for a single 
vehicle when the security policy permits access and will be closed immediately after that vehicle 
passed through. For vehicle exiting there is no need for tag checking. The barriers also 
communicate about vehicle passing information with remote-control. 
The barriers in the controlled area perform much simpler tasks. They must allow a vehicle to 
pass through when the controlled-area is unblocked and otherwise access is denied. They also 
communicate with the remote-control. 
 
Event-B system specification 
The first task in our formal development is to create an abstract B-action system from 
informal presentation of case study in previous section. The above informal presentation of the 
system does not pretend to be complete or to have covered all the technical aspects. Indeed, it is 
merely the starting point for constructing the final concrete system. In the event-based discrete 
modelling a system is characterised by a finite list of variables that are modified by a finite list of 
events. An invariant establishes properties satisfied by variables and maintained by activation of 
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we are going to extract the main elements and building blocks of the first formal specification; 
they are state variables and related events.  
First illustration of system is presented in fig (2). BARRIER is a type to identify the set of 
barriers units and BARRIER_STATUS to model the status of barriers. CTRL_STATUS represent 
two possible status of controlled-area and VEHICLE, TAG and MSG are types that have been 
used to identify vehicles, tags and messages respectively. The fact that every vehicle in system 
must be in some places and the type of access for a specific vehicle that approaching a barrier in 
protected or controlled areas demonstrated by LOC and ACCESS types. It can be perceived that 
the two types of barriers in protected and controlled area are presented with PBARRIER and 
CBARRIER as subset of barriers and m1 to m4 represent the format of different messages that can 
be exchange between barriers and remote-control. Before considering the VARIABLES and 
INVARIANT clause some clarifications about order of events occurrence in the system seems to 
be necessary.     
 
MACHINE               AccessCtrl1
 
SETS        BARRIER;      
               BARRIER_STATUS={open,close,failed}; CTRL_STATUS= {blocked,unblocked}; 
               VEHICLE; TAG ;MSG;  LOC={outside,controlled,protected}; 
              ACCESS={permitted,denied,directly_obtained,withheld} 
CONSTANTS 
               PBARRIER, CBARRIER,     
               m1,m2,m3,m4 
PROPERTIES 
               PBARRIER⊆ BARRIER ∧ CBARRIER⊆ BARRIER ∧ 
               PBARRIER ∩ CBARRIER = ∅ ∧ PBARRIER ∪ CBARRIER = BARRIER ∧ 
               m1: (TAG×ACCESS)  MSG ∧ m2: (VEHICLE×TAG)  MSG ∧ 
              m3: (CTRL_STATUS)  MSG ∧ m4: (VEHICLE×LOC)  MSG 
VARIABLES      
              kmsgbuf,bmsgbuf, kctrl_state,kloc,ktag,kaut,kpolicy, 
              ctrl_state,loc,tag,aut,policy 
INVARIANT    
            kmsgbuf∈ seq(MSG)∧ bmsgbuf∈ seq(MSG)∧ 
            kctrl_state∈ CTRL_STATUS ∧ kloc∈ VEHICLE→LOC∧ ktag ⊆ TAG ∧  
            kaut∈ VEHICLE   ktag ∧ kpolicy∈ ktag→ACCESS ∧ ctrl_state∈ CTRL_STATUS ∧   
            loc∈ VEHICLE→LOC ∧ tag⊆TAG ∧ aut∈ VEHICLE  tag ∧ policy∈ tag→ACCESS 
fig (2) 
 
Some basic events in system can be identified as adding new tag, assigning a tag 
to a vehicle, changing current access policy and changing the status of 
controlled-area.  Regarding the asynchronous nature of the system these events can not 
happen in the remote-control and different barriers unit simultaneously. For example consider a 
simple scenario where the Remote-Control updates the system with information about a new 
access policy associated with a valid tag and meanwhile a vehicle with the same tag approaches 
a barrier which has not yet received the updated policy. In this situation the barrier will deal with 
the approaching vehicle according to old policy that it is no longer valid form view point of the 
Remote-Control. In other words, the variables in the Remote-Control and the barriers can be 
inconsistent in some time intervals due to delay and errors in communication links between these 
two parts. Therefore two different versions of variables have been considered for remote-control 
with a prefix of “k” and for barriers without this prefix. For example ctrl-sate represents the 
status of the controlled area as understood by barriers and kctrl-sate is state as understood by 
the Remote-Control. Accordingly for those events that can happen both in the Remote-Control 
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labelled with “initialise” and “finalise” prefixes. 
The variable kmsgbuf is holding the messages that remote-control is sending for barriers and 
bmsgbuf is holding messages from barriers to remote-control. Both have the type of sequence 
to preserve the order of messages as a critical property of communication link. Considering the 
fact that authorised vehicles are a subset of all vehicles that holding a valid tag and each valid tag 
is mapped to a specific access type are reflected in invariant type definition of kaut, kpolicy, 
aut and policy.    
 
 
fig (3) 
OPERATIONS 
 InitialiseAdd_tag(tt,aa) = 
   PRE tt∈ TAG ∧ aa∈ ACCESS  THEN 
     SELECT tt∈ TAG ∧ tt∉ ktag ∧ aa∈ ACCESS THEN 
       ktag:= ktag ∪ {tt} || kpolicy:= kpolicy ∪ {ttaaa} || kmsgbuf:= kmsgbuf← m1(tt,aa) 
     END 
   END; 
FinaliseAdd_tag = 
    ANY tt,aa WHERE tt∈  TAG ∧ tt∉ tag ∧ aa∈ ACCESS ∧  kmsgbuf≠ []∧ first(kmsgbuf)= m1(tt,aa) THEN
       tag:= tag ∪{tt} || policy:= policy ∪ {ttaaa}|| kmsgbuf:= tail(kmsgbuf) 
    END; 
 InitialiseAssign_tag(vv,tt) = 
    …….. 
FinaliseAssign_tag = 
   …………. 
InitialiseChange_policy(tt,aa) = 
     …… 
FinaliseChange_policy = 
    …….. 
Enter_controlledArea(vv) =     
   PRE vv∈ VEHICLE    THEN 
     SELECT ctrl_state= unblocked ∧ loc(vv)= outside THEN 
      loc(vv):=controlled || bmsgbuf:= bmsgbuf← m4(vv,controlled) 
     END  
   END; 
 Enter_protectedArea(vv) =     
   PRE vv∈ VEHICLE    THEN 
     SELECT loc(vv)= outside ∧ policy(aut(vv))= permitted THEN  
      loc(vv):=protected || bmsgbuf:= bmsgbuf← m4(vv,protected)  
     END  
   END;  
 InitialiseEmer_Enter(bb,vv) =     
   PRE bb∈ PBARRIER ∧ vv∈ VEHICLE  THEN 
    skip 
   END;  
Exit_Area(vv) =     
   PRE vv∈ VEHICLE  THEN 
     SELECT vv∈ VEHICLE ∧ loc(vv)≠ outside THEN  
      loc(vv):=outside || bmsgbuf:= bmsgbuf← m4(vv,outside)   
     END  
   END; 
……… 
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In fig (3) some events of the system-level specification are illustrated. These events represent 
some observable behaviour of overall system but we have not put a clear boundary around 
individual subsystems. Furthermore we have not demonstrated the detailed operation of barriers.  
 
First Refinement of system 
In the first refinement both data and event refinements have been undertaken. Some detailed 
operations of the barriers in connection with the approaching vehicle and remote-control are 
introduced. For example events like VehArv_CBarrier,  VehArv_PBarrier,  Detect_tag, 
Deny, Open, Close and Close_timeout are internal operation of barriers that can be observed 
in that level. Introducing the barrier definition in the refinement process brought the feasibility of 
refining some operations of the first-level formal specification like FinaliseAssign_tag, 
FinaliseChange_ctrlArea,  Enter_controlledArea,  Enter_protectedArea and 
Exit_Area. The monitoring task is another aspect of the Remote-Control functionality that it is 
presented by Request_barrierstate,  Barrier_sendstate and Read_barrierstate 
events. 
 
Decomposition to subsystem and further refinement 
  Decomposition is a main approach to dealing with inherited complexity of distributed 
systems which is stated in [8] and [11]. From the previous refinement, decomposition of system 
to asynchronous subsystem is a straightforward task. The system as a whole comprises three 
subsystem named Remote-control,  Communication and Barrier. Each subsystem can be 
represented by a single machine at that point which these machines are susceptible to further 
refinement. Some operation of communication mechanism is introduced in this level and more 
refinement can be envisaged for error handling, loss and security aspect like encryption.     
 
Conclusion 
We presented an event-based system-level modelling for an asynchronous distributed system 
with B. Dealing with complex properties of such systems can be a time consuming approach 
which needs sufficient training and skills in formal methods, system modelling and distributed 
systems. For better understanding and sufficient modelling maybe consideration of a variety of 
methodologies and tools could help developers. As further work more refinement of the barrier 
unit intending to model interactions between different physical parts of this subsystem could be 
considered. Communication subsystem can be subjected to more refinement for error-handling 
and security aspect modelling.    
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